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[enm. No. 5809. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALFRED LEONZA BEARD, 
Appellant. 
[1) Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where no evidence is 
presented for the purpose of determining whether or not offi-
eers had reasonable cause for making an arrest and searching 
defendant's automobile, it must be presumed that the arrest 
and search were justified. 
[2) Arrest-Making Arrest.-Where the trial court found that 
defendant was arrested while engaged in commission of the 
offense charged, there was no violation of Pen. Code, § 841, 
requiring the person making an arrest to inform the person 
to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, the cause of 
his arrest and the authority to make it, except when the person 
to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or 
attempt to commit an offense. 
(1] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 21 et seq. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; r2] 
Arrest, §13; [3] Criminal Law, §970(4). 
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[3] Oriminal Law-New 'l'rial-NewlJ Discovered Evidenee.-It 
was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence where there was 
no showing that defendant's former attorney could not have 
had a potential witness subpoenaed had his testimony been 
wanted at the trial and no showing why another witness, who 
lived near the scene of the arrest, could not be located and 
subpoenaed or why the same investigation to locate her after 
the trial would not have succeeded had reasonable diligence 
been used earlier, and where neither defendant's nor his new 
attorney's affidavit stated facts indicating that failure to 
ob\.ain the evidence presented was owing to any lack of dili. 
gence of the former attorney. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Thomas L. Ambrose, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
Joseph H. Lewis and E. V. Cavanaugh for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Marvin Gross and Joan D. Gross, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11500), and one prior misdemeanor conviction of the same 
ofi'ense. A jury trial was waived, and by stipulation the 
prosecution's case was submitted on the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. Defendant testified in his own behalf. 
He was found guilty and sentenced to the state prison for 
the term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment 
and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
Officer Buckner of the Los Angeles Police Department 
testified that shortly after noon on September 17, 1954, he 
and another officer were driving north on Maple Avenue when 
they observed defendant and a friend of his named Fortier 
driving west on 29th Street. Defendant was driving. The 
officers overshot 29th Street, went around the block and 
came back on 29th Street approaching Maple Avenue from 
the west. They observed defendant's car parked ahead of 
them. Defendant and Fortier then started driving down the 
street toward the officers' car, and when they had gone about 
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half a block, the officers stopped them, got them out of the 
car, and searched them and the car. A marijuana cigarette 
was found under the left hand side of the front seat, and . 
some brown cigarette paper was found in one of defendant's 
pockets. Defendant then accused the officers of "planting 
him." Officer Buckner also searched the area near the place 
where defendant's ear had been parked, and inside a fence 
found six marijuana cigarettes wrapped in wax paper.-
Defendant testified that he stopped for Fortier at his home 
about 10 minutes before he was stopped by the officers. He 
stopped again at 29th and Maple so that Fortier could buy 
something at the corner, and defendant also got out of the 
car to fix his foot pedal. He did not see the officers find a 
cigarette in his car, and neither of them showed him the 
cigarette that Officer Buckner testified was found in the ear, 
and he did not know that there was any marijuana cigarette 
in his car. He worked as a janitor and had left his ear open 
on various occasions. 
After he was found guilty, defendant secured new counsel 
and moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (8).) He presented 
affidavits of Fortier and a person who lived near the scene I 
of the arrest, and each affiant stated that he had observed 
the search of the car and that neitber officer had found a 
marijuana cigarette in the car. He also filed an affidavit in 
his own behalf stating that he was personally unable to secure 
the evidence before the trial because he was in custody. His 
new counsel filed an affidavit stating that he had no knowledge 
as to why defendant's witnesses were not produced at his trial. 
[1] Defendant contends that the officers did not have rea-
sonable cause to believe that he had committed a felony and 
that therefore his arrest and the search of his automobile 
were illegal. This case was tried before the decision in People 
v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], no evidence was 
presented for the purpose of determining whether or not 
the officers had reasonable cause for making an arrest, and 
the record is completely silent on this question. In People v. 
Farrara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21], we held that under 
these circumstances it must be presumed that the arrest was 
justified. 
-The committing magistra.te refused to admit these eigarettes In 
evidence on the ground that they had not been sufficiently connected with 
defendant, and the trial court stated that he did not consider the testi· 
mony of the officer eoncerning them in finding defendant guilty. 
) 
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[2] Defendant also contends, however, that the oftice1'8 
failed to comply with section 841 of the Penal Code and the 
arrest was therefore unlawful. That section provides: "The 
person making the arrest must inform the person to be ar-
rested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, 
and the authority to make it, except when the person to ~ 
arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an 
attempt to commit an offense, or is pursued immediately after 
its commission, or after an escape." The record is not clear 
as to just what the officers . said to defendant at the time 
of the arrest and search, and it may be conceded that there 
is some evidence that they did not expressly inform him "of 
the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and 
the authority to make it." Since the trial court found, how-
ever, that defendant was arrested while engaged in the com-
mission of the offense, there was no violation of section 841. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. 
Penal Code, section 1181, provides: 
"When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made 
against the defendant, the court may, upon his application, 
grant a new trial, in the following cases only: ... 
"8. When new evidence is discovered material to the de-
fendant, and which he ('ould not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered and produced at the trial. ... " 
In People v. McGarry, 42 Ca1.2d 429, 432 [267 P.2d 254], 
it was pointed out that a motion for a new trial is addressed 
to the Bound discretion of the trial court, and that "The 
elements of the standard by which a trial court in its dis-
cretion may properly grant a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence are set forth in People v. Sutton, 
73 Cal. 243 [15 P. 86]. At page 247 it is stated that 'it must 
appear,-eel. That the evidence, and not merely its ma-
teriality be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not 
cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different 
result probable on retrial of the cause; 4. That the party 
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and pro-
duced it at the trial j and 5. That these facts be shown by 
the best evidence of which the case admits." (1 Hayne on 
New Trial and Appeal, § 88.)' More recent eases have turned 
on a lack of one or more of the foregoing requirements, but 
the over-all rules have withstood the test of time and properly 
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state the existing law. (See PeopJe v. Rickard, 101 Cal.App. 
2d 631, 635-636 [225 P.2d 938].)" (42 Cal.2d at 433.) 
[3] In the light of the foregoing rules it cannot be said 
that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Thus, 
Fortier was present in defendant's ear at the time of the I 
arrest and search and was also charged with a violation of 
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, which charge was 
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Obviously defendant 
was aware that Fortier was a potential witness, and it is not 
claimed that his former attorney could not have had him 
subpoenaed had his testimony been wanted at the trial. 
Similarly there is no showing as to why the other witness 
could not be located and subpoenaed. She lived near the 
scene of the arrest, and the trial court could reasonably infer 
from the fact that she was close enough to observe the search, 
that defendant was aware of her presence at the time. Al-
though, while he was in custody, defendant could not per-
sonally locate this witness, there is no showing why the same 
investigation made to locate her after the trial would not 
have succeeded had reasonable diligence been used earlier. 
Moreover, although defendant now contends that he should 
not be penalized for any lack of diligence on the part of 
his former attorney, neither his nor his present attorney's 
affidavit states facts indicating that the failure to obtain the 
evidence now presented was owing to any l.ck of diligence 
of the former attorney. Defendant does not state that he 
informed his former attorney that bystanders witnessed the 
search, that he requested that she attempt to locate such 
witnesses, or that she refused to make any attempt to secure 
witnesses in his behalf. Under these circumstances the trial 
court could reasonably conclude that defendant had not shown 
that the decision to rely solely on his own testimony was 
other than his own, or that the evidence now presented was 
evidence "which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial." (Pen. Code, § 1181, 
subd. (8).) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Since the facts of this case with respect to the reasonable-
ness of the search are quite similar to those in the case of 
) 
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People v. Martin, Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52]. 
I refer to my dissent in that case as an expression of my 
views on the law applicable to the case at bar. 
There is another reason why I would reverse the judgment 
in the case at bar which is not mentioned in my dissent in 
the Martin cast', supra. As pointed out in the majority opinion 
in the case at bar, this case was tried before the decision 
of this court in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434[282 P.2d 
905], and therefore the trial court did not have before it 
or take into consideration the rule announced in the Caban 
case with respect to the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence. Neither did the trial court have occasion to pass 
upon the reasonableness of the search and seizure as this 
factor was not considered material under the rule and prac-
tice which existed prior to the decision of this court in the 
Caban case. For this reason we do not have the benefit of 
the finding of the trial court on the question of whether or 
not the officers who conducted the search here had reasonable 
cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony or 
was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of 
the search. Wbileit is my opinion, that on the record before 
us, no reasonable cause is shown for the search of the de-
fendant, and it must therefore be declared to be an illegal 
search, it may be that if the case against the defendant was 
being prosecuted in the light of what was said by this court 
in the Caban case and cases which have followed that ease, 
the prosecution would no doubt offer any evidence available 
for the purpose of showing the reasonableness of the search 
and the trial court would necessarily make a finding on this 
issue in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence obtained 
as the result of the search. If there was a conflict in the 
evidence on this issue, we would be bound by the finding 
of the trial court the same as we should be bound by such a 
finding in any other case. 
I can see no justification whatsoever for the holding of 
the majority in this case that the evidence as a matter of 
law shows that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe 
that defendant had committed or was engaged in the com-
mission of a felony at the time they made the search and 
seizure here involved, but on the contrary it appears from 
the face of the record that the only conclusion that can be 
drawn is that the officers had no cause whatever to believe 
defendant had committed or was engaged in the commission 
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of a felony and therefore the search and seizure was illegal 
and the evidence obtained thereby should be held inadmissible 
under the rule in the Cahan case. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment and remand the 
case for a new trial so that the trial court would have an 
opportunity to pass upon the reasonableness of the search 
in view of the evidence which might then be presented in the 
light of the decision of this court in the Cahan case and other 
cases involving this same subject matter since the decision 
of this court in the Cahan case. 
